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This issue of The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics marks the Journal's
25h volume and 251h anniversary. But it also celebrates a special moment in
the journal's history: for the first time, this past March, the GJLE hosted an
interdisciplinary conversation between a filmmaker, former prosecutors, law
professors, defense attorneys, and graduate students. Several questions prompted
this gathering: First, do prosecutors have a distinctive legal "culture"? What are
the shared assumptions that define it? And how do those assumptions synchro-
nize or conflict with the behaviors we deem ethical?
If a U.S. Attorney, for instance, learns of DNA evidence exonerating a person
she prosecuted, why might she be more likely to create alternate theories to
support the conviction rather than confront the possibility of a horrific mistake?
This is a psychological issue that goes beyond ethical rules and gaps in the law.
What we're really talking about are the social and cultural forces acting on a
person's mind.
To get at this issue, filmmaker Ofra Bikel shared excerpts from two of her PBS
"Frontline" productions-"The Case for Innocence" (2000) and "An Ordinary
Crime" (2002). Both describe wrongful convictions with ethnographic details
often lost in legal opinions; each segment drew on the narratives of victims, their
family members, and a community of legal scholars, advocates, and observers.
Our panelists, though they had very different perspectives, agreed that the
social and psychological forces at work in prosecutors' offices create their own
cultures-and affect the way attorneys treat exculpatory evidence. Professor
Angela Davis, who formerly served as director of the D.C. Public Defender
Service, believed that the culture of prosecutors' offices is set by those at the top.
She pointed to Craig Watkins, the Dallas County District Attorney, who created a
Conviction Integrity Unit to re-investigate cases where there were post-
conviction claims of innocence.
As a former prosecutor, Professor Paul Butler offered insight into prosecutorial
culture-where, in his experience, defendants were referred to as "cretins and
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douchebags." Butler also knows prosecutorial culture because he was prosecuted
himself (for simple assault). He compared the experience to being on an
assembly line and held that he, like most defendants, had been denied access to
the evidence used against him.
Deborah Connor, who serves as Deputy Chief in the Federal Major Crimes
section at the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, agreed
that prosecutors' offices need to encourage an attitude of openness about
revisiting convictions. But she also reminded us that prosecutors make ethical
decisions-including those not to charge defendants-every day. These are just
invisible parts of the process; documentaries don't get made when prosecutors do
their jobs correctly.
There is little question that prosecutorial misconduct and discretion will
continue to fill conversations. Aside from changing the culture of prosecutors'
offices from the inside-or through greater external regulation-others advocate
for empowering the jury to serve as a check to prosecutorial discretion. Roger
Fairfax, who contributed an article to this issue, has written in the past about the
greater role grand jurors could play in offsetting abuses of prosecutorial
discretion.' And in the case of trial juries, there is concern that even prospective
jurors are subject to unlawful elimination by prosecutors who use a disproportion-
ate number of peremptory challenges to eliminate black jurors.2
Most of all, though, the symposium highlighted the benefit of disparate
perspectives. By drawing on the insights of social scientists, practitioners,
teachers, and outside observers, the GJLE was able to help illuminate the
different ethical values embedded in criminal process-and how they are
understood by those with the power to change them.
1. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and Useful Role to Play
in Criminal Justice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0, (2010).
2. Complaint, Dennis Hall et al. v. Valeska, Case No. 1:1 1-cv-00894-WHA-CSC, (M.D. Ala., Oct. 19,2011);
See generally Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, Equal Justice Initiative,
(Aug. 2010), http://eji.org/ejilfiles/EJI%2ORace%20and%2OJury%20Report.pdf.
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